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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3857 
___________ 
 
LIN LIN LIN, 
 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                          Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-686-780) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 1, 2013 
 
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 5, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lin Lin Lin is a citizen of China who entered the United States without inspection 
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in 2001.  Several years later, she filed an application for asylum and withholding of 
removal, alleging persecution under China’s coercive population control policies.1  In 
particular, Lin alleged that she would be persecuted because she is the parent of two 
United States citizen children.  Following a merits hearing, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
denied relief, based on Lin’s lack of credibility and her failure to establish that she would 
face forced sterilization upon return to China.  In April 2009, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) affirmed, holding that, even assuming credibility, the 
“evidence, in addition to the documentation assessed in our published cases, does not 
demonstrate a reasonable chance of forcible sterilization in the Fujian province after the 
birth of a second United States citizen child.” 
 In February 2012, Lin filed a motion to reopen in which she repeated her assertion 
that she feared persecution based on China’s family planning policies and added a claim 
based on her practice of Christianity.  The Board denied the motion, holding that it was 
untimely and that Lin had not satisfied the conditions for reopening based on changed 
circumstances in China.  In particular, the BIA rejected documents that were not 
accompanied by English versions or properly authenticated.  With respect to Lin’s 
allegations of religious persecution, the BIA concluded Lin “has offered no evidence of 
the attitude of local officials in her hometown at the time of the [IJ’s] decision that 
reflects a change in conditions to warrant reopening . . . .”  Lin then filed a counseled 
                                              
1
 The application was originally filed by Lin and her husband.  Lin’s husband is not 
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petition for review.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.   “Review of the BIA’s decision 
to deny a motion to reopen is under a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.”  
Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2011).  Under this standard, we may 
reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian 
v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  A motion to reopen 
generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the removal order.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  This limitation does not apply, 
however, to a motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on 
changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, if such evidence is material 
and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
hearing.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  
 Lin’s motion to reopen, filed almost three years after the BIA entered the final 
removal order, was clearly untimely.  In addition, we agree with the Board that the 
evidence Lin submitted with her motion to reopen was insufficient to demonstrate 
changed circumstances.  Lin claimed that she was “informed by the villagers’ committee 
in her hometown that she is subject to the population control policy.”  In support of this 
assertion, Lin provided a letter from her mother, which stated that she had received a 
“certificate” after asking the “local Villagers Committee for consultation” about whether 
                                                                                                                                                  
participating in these proceedings. 
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Lin had violated the population control policy.  The record also contains two “Notarial 
Certificate[s]” that refer to photocopies of documents issued to Lin by the “Committee of 
Kefeng Villager Tantou Town Changle City” on September 20, 2011 and October 2, 
2011.  Significantly, however, because the record does not contain English versions of 
these documents, the Board was unable to assess their content or evaluate their 
significance.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.33 (describing requirements for translation of 
documents).  Lin concedes that she failed to provide the English translations, but urges us 
to remand the petition for review so that she can correct this omission.  We decline to do 
so.  Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (providing that “the court of appeals shall decide the 
petition only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based”). 
 The Board also concluded that the “documents from Chinese Government sources 
have not been properly authenticated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1287.6(b)” because they “are 
not certified by an officer in the Foreign Service of the United States stationed in China.”  
The Board acknowledged that § 1287.6 is not the exclusive means for authenticating 
records, but declined to credit the documents in part because of the IJ’s prior adverse 
credibility determination.  Insofar as these documents pertained to Lin’s family planning 
policy claim, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion.  See Lin v. Att’y 
Gen., 700 F.3d 683, 688 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that prior adverse credibility 
determination was relevant to authenticity of documents submitted in support of a motion 
to reopen, where both the initial application and motion to reopen “are based on the same 
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underlying basis for asylum.”).   
 In addition, the Board properly concluded that Lin failed to present material 
evidence demonstrating that conditions for Christians in China had changed since her 
hearing before the IJ in 2008.  The record before the IJ included the 2007 State 
Department Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions for China, which 
indicated that although the Chinese government does attempt to suppress unregistered 
religions, the degree of suppression varies depending on the location, size, and 
prominence of the unauthorized religious activity.  Lin’s motion to reopen did not include 
a more recent version of the State Department Profile.  Instead, as evidence of current 
conditions for Christians in China, Lin relied on a letter from a friend, which stated that 
she was fined, arrested, and detained for five days in September 2011 after being found in 
possession of religious materials that Lin had sent to her.  The Board did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that this evidence fails to demonstrate that conditions have 
worsened for Chinese Christians since the time of Lin’s merits hearing in 2008. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
